Non-Reductive Conceptions of Difference
“If ‘everyday life’ is going to provide a re-imagining of the study of culture…then it might need to put on hold the automatic explanatory value placed on accepted cultural differences. If cultural differences, such as gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity and so on, are going to be useful for the understanding of everyday life (and I assume that they would be) then there usefulness cannot be just presumed or taken for granted”(2). I am drawn to this quotation because of the conversation that occurred in our small group about whether or not Highmore wants to do away with the notion of difference in favor of commonality. From this quotation I take away the idea that Highmore places a high value on differences between people, that differences are “useful for the understanding of everyday life.” In addition Highmore adds that the identity categories normally used to “classify” people should not be assumed to mean the same thing to each person that may characterize or be characterized by these identity categories. In other words these identities black, brown, white, lesbian, upper-class etc should not be essentialized and fixed as having the same meaning in all contexts for all people. However, while writing these words I see myself alluding to a more nuanced version of differences, as opposed to contemplating his idea of commonality. However, on the next page Highmore suggests that it is the “negotiation” between differences and commonalities that is necessary. So that while we may visibly see, and viscerally feel differences, in our selves, and between ourselves and others, that these differences may not have to be divisive. This may indeed sound a bit “cum-by-ah,” but I do think that we often tend to solely focus on differences, without being at all considerate of ways we might be similar (not the same) as someone else. However, I also think that in order to find commonalities people must be willing to see the things that may mark our bodies as different and be self-reflexive in understanding how power and privilege work in everyday interactions. I think this idea touches on much of what Judith Hamera is saying when she states her second thesis: “Reductive conceptions of everyday practices ignore the social, historical, and political realities that enable or constrain communication”(14). I believe Hamera is echoing Highmore’s sentiments that people’s lived realities are more rich and complex then the labeling of differences can account for. While she is not specifically calling for an examination of commonalities, she is also not set on simply identifying differences, but on examining their layers. Like Highmore, Hamera wants to look at the rich complexities of everyday practices, which, reductive accounts of everyday-ness ignore. Hamera definitely wants differences to be a component of analyses of “the everyday”, however, like Highmore; Hamera is interested in a non-reductive view of the everyday but a more generative approach. I think that this can prove to be a useful too for examining the everyday, one that accounts for difference, but doesn’t settle for it to be simply “the way things are” without the potentiality for things to grow, change, and challenge the status quo.Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Performance and the Everyday
Performance and the Everyday
I am very interested in making the connection between the “everyday” and “performance.” I feel that performance has the potential to inform the study of everyday life mainly through tactics of resistance to the reiterative practices we perform everyday often without even thinking about them. As Judith Hamera says: “Central to all such readings are aesthetics, the animating principles of art’s social lives. These principles emerge in the objects and events that aesthetic practice leaves behind, and in the routine transactions of those for whom art making is, and happens in, a neighborhood, a set of corporeal possibilities, comforts and constraints linking private self- and object-fashioning to community practice”(47). Hamera is invoking Dwight Conquergood’s notion to “To move [performance] outside of Aesthetics and situate it at the center of lived experience”(Hamera 46). This positions performance as not solely something that occurs on a stage with an audience but as something that happens in the everyday. It also insinuates that these everyday actions can be artful, beautiful, and aesthetically pleasing. Performance then becomes the way in which we enact in our everyday lives. However, performance isn’t simple, we don’t have endless performances available at our disposal, we only have performances that position us within the discourse as negotiated within society, culture, and history. Hamera allows us to see the ballet studio, ritualized Native American performances, and others as aesthetic performances that are grounded in the everyday, mainly through the body. Our bodies do have constraints within the everyday; we position ourselves and are positioned in culture through our bodies. But I have to believe that to some little extent my body in not devoid of agency but can instead choose to enact a very micro, yet resistive performance. This performance may not be as extravagant as some of the cultural performances Hamera shows us, but they are aesthetic performances that occur in the everyday. I am thinking of Tiffany’s example f being a person of color and nodding at another person of color while waiting for public transportation. This may not seem grandiose, but to me this is an aesthetic person. Although it is not performed on a stage there is some ritualistic element to it, one that says, “I may be the only person to offer this to you today, but I see you, I recognize your humanity,” There is an art form to this, something beautiful in that human connection. Of course I have not had this experience, I can never fully understand it, but I can empathize with it and recognize how it can function as a mode of resistance to dominant ideologies. Sometimes these small processes are what are truly resistive and yet aesthetic at the same time. As Highmore suggests, “If the everyday is that which is most recognizable, then what happens when the world is disturbed and disrupted by the unfamiliar”(Figuring the Everyday)? The unfamiliar becomes those performances that disrupt and challenge the everyday-ness of everyday practices. Sometimes these are grand bodily performances like practicing and performing ballet, sometimes it is a more simplistic head, nod but both performances allow us to have agency in the everyday. I am going to post a link to a video that Arianna posted last year that relates somewhat to what I am writing about but is just a really cool understanding of disruption of the everyday. [youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EYAUazLI9k&hl=en&fs=1&]XXSurveillance and the Black Female Body
Walking in the City, Space, and Resistance
Interviews, Power, and Change
Queer Public Cultures
Affective Narrative
Humour
Humor: The Mind, The Body, and Affect
I am very interested in the corporeal aspects of humor and how this relates to the affective subject.
As Simon Critchley writes:
Let me go back to the body. If humour is, as I suggested, the return of the physical into the metaphysical, then it is important to point out that the human being remains an ineluctably metaphysical entity…if the bodily dimension of the comic takes place in the gap between being and having, between our souls and arseholes, then this hole cannot be plugged or bunged up. We cannot simultaneously be what we have. The critical distance with regard to the world and nature that opens up in the incongruities of humour is testified to in the alienation we experience with regard to our bodies. This is why the experience of the body in pain is so oddly analogous to the pleasures of laughter—which is why it can hurt when you laugh(50).
Firstly I do not know what this means. Not wholly. But I felt here are a few key ideas that I would like to work through and to a degree “flesh out.” Critchley defines humor in terms of a gap between the physical body and the metaphysical self and the returning of those two dimensions to one another. I frame this in my own mind—humor is a reconciliation of the supposed mind/body dichotomy or split. Humor affects not only the body in the form of something physically happening, but we can only make sense of this humor through the logos of the mind, of realizing that whatever funny thing just happened, broke with logic of the mind. And I think maybe this is what Critchley is getting at—that humor is not located solely in the body or in the mind. Humor is located at the intersections of both body and mind.
But there is a place I think that humor works that is maybe not even in the realm of just a simple mind/body split, but that instead humor exists in its next affective nature. Humor exists somewhat in its public nature, in its ability to affect people in public scenarios. Humor wouldn’t necessarily be funny if someone else wasn’t around not to witness it. Thus, humour is both in the mind, in the body and in the affective gaps between, around, and underneath, these temporal and spatial locations.
Incongruency is key here. Humor is all about incongruency and the complexities of non-sense making. The things that are funny are so in part because they are unexpected and do not meet normative expectations. I am reminded of Margaret Cho, an Asian-American bisexual comedian and some of her skits. There is one part in a skit where she takes on the identity of an old “Washer Woman” named Gwen. When you would expect to her to be coming around asking to take in work like laundry, or ironing (as is stereotypical Asian women’swork) she instead pretends to be going around using the line “Hi, my name is Gwen and I’M HERE TO WARSH YER VAGIIIIIIIIINA!!!!!!!!” It’s funny because it is unexpected and really doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. But I laugh because I find it humorous that an Asian woman, supposedly old, a/de sexualized is walking around asking women if she can warsh their vaginas. It does not make sense but we cans see the connection of the mind and body while simultaneously sublimating them. The body is necessary but the mind is also. In the scenario as an audience we are affected by the consequences of stereotyping of Asian women and ways to de normalize those stereotypes.
I don’t have any answers, but I do think that humor is not as simple as we sometimes assume it to be. It is not just that some things are funny and others are not. There are gaps where humor occurs, spaces between bodies and minds. And even then, humor is not simple; it is a complex set of relations, practices, and performances of bodies and the affects of these performances on others. Is there ever an original place of humor, or something’s inherent funny-ness? I don’t think so, which is why I think it is important to think of the humor in terms of the mind, the, body, and affect.