Non-Reductive Conceptions of Difference
“If ‘everyday life’ is going to provide a re-imagining of the study of culture…then it might need to put on hold the automatic explanatory value placed on accepted cultural differences. If cultural differences, such as gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity and so on, are going to be useful for the understanding of everyday life (and I assume that they would be) then there usefulness cannot be just presumed or taken for granted”(2). I am drawn to this quotation because of the conversation that occurred in our small group about whether or not Highmore wants to do away with the notion of difference in favor of commonality. From this quotation I take away the idea that Highmore places a high value on differences between people, that differences are “useful for the understanding of everyday life.” In addition Highmore adds that the identity categories normally used to “classify” people should not be assumed to mean the same thing to each person that may characterize or be characterized by these identity categories. In other words these identities black, brown, white, lesbian, upper-class etc should not be essentialized and fixed as having the same meaning in all contexts for all people. However, while writing these words I see myself alluding to a more nuanced version of differences, as opposed to contemplating his idea of commonality. However, on the next page Highmore suggests that it is the “negotiation” between differences and commonalities that is necessary. So that while we may visibly see, and viscerally feel differences, in our selves, and between ourselves and others, that these differences may not have to be divisive. This may indeed sound a bit “cum-by-ah,” but I do think that we often tend to solely focus on differences, without being at all considerate of ways we might be similar (not the same) as someone else. However, I also think that in order to find commonalities people must be willing to see the things that may mark our bodies as different and be self-reflexive in understanding how power and privilege work in everyday interactions. I think this idea touches on much of what Judith Hamera is saying when she states her second thesis: “Reductive conceptions of everyday practices ignore the social, historical, and political realities that enable or constrain communication”(14). I believe Hamera is echoing Highmore’s sentiments that people’s lived realities are more rich and complex then the labeling of differences can account for. While she is not specifically calling for an examination of commonalities, she is also not set on simply identifying differences, but on examining their layers. Like Highmore, Hamera wants to look at the rich complexities of everyday practices, which, reductive accounts of everyday-ness ignore. Hamera definitely wants differences to be a component of analyses of “the everyday”, however, like Highmore; Hamera is interested in a non-reductive view of the everyday but a more generative approach. I think that this can prove to be a useful too for examining the everyday, one that accounts for difference, but doesn’t settle for it to be simply “the way things are” without the potentiality for things to grow, change, and challenge the status quo.Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Performance and the Everyday
Performance and the Everyday
I am very interested in making the connection between the “everyday” and “performance.” I feel that performance has the potential to inform the study of everyday life mainly through tactics of resistance to the reiterative practices we perform everyday often without even thinking about them. As Judith Hamera says: “Central to all such readings are aesthetics, the animating principles of art’s social lives. These principles emerge in the objects and events that aesthetic practice leaves behind, and in the routine transactions of those for whom art making is, and happens in, a neighborhood, a set of corporeal possibilities, comforts and constraints linking private self- and object-fashioning to community practice”(47). Hamera is invoking Dwight Conquergood’s notion to “To move [performance] outside of Aesthetics and situate it at the center of lived experience”(Hamera 46). This positions performance as not solely something that occurs on a stage with an audience but as something that happens in the everyday. It also insinuates that these everyday actions can be artful, beautiful, and aesthetically pleasing. Performance then becomes the way in which we enact in our everyday lives. However, performance isn’t simple, we don’t have endless performances available at our disposal, we only have performances that position us within the discourse as negotiated within society, culture, and history. Hamera allows us to see the ballet studio, ritualized Native American performances, and others as aesthetic performances that are grounded in the everyday, mainly through the body. Our bodies do have constraints within the everyday; we position ourselves and are positioned in culture through our bodies. But I have to believe that to some little extent my body in not devoid of agency but can instead choose to enact a very micro, yet resistive performance. This performance may not be as extravagant as some of the cultural performances Hamera shows us, but they are aesthetic performances that occur in the everyday. I am thinking of Tiffany’s example f being a person of color and nodding at another person of color while waiting for public transportation. This may not seem grandiose, but to me this is an aesthetic person. Although it is not performed on a stage there is some ritualistic element to it, one that says, “I may be the only person to offer this to you today, but I see you, I recognize your humanity,” There is an art form to this, something beautiful in that human connection. Of course I have not had this experience, I can never fully understand it, but I can empathize with it and recognize how it can function as a mode of resistance to dominant ideologies. Sometimes these small processes are what are truly resistive and yet aesthetic at the same time. As Highmore suggests, “If the everyday is that which is most recognizable, then what happens when the world is disturbed and disrupted by the unfamiliar”(Figuring the Everyday)? The unfamiliar becomes those performances that disrupt and challenge the everyday-ness of everyday practices. Sometimes these are grand bodily performances like practicing and performing ballet, sometimes it is a more simplistic head, nod but both performances allow us to have agency in the everyday. I am going to post a link to a video that Arianna posted last year that relates somewhat to what I am writing about but is just a really cool understanding of disruption of the everyday. [youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EYAUazLI9k&hl=en&fs=1&]XXSurveillance and the Black Female Body
Walking in the City, Space, and Resistance
Interviews, Power, and Change
Queer Public Cultures
Affective Narrative
Humour
Humor: The Mind, The Body, and Affect
I am very interested in the corporeal aspects of humor and how this relates to the affective subject.
As Simon Critchley writes:
Let me go back to the body. If humour is, as I suggested, the return of the physical into the metaphysical, then it is important to point out that the human being remains an ineluctably metaphysical entity…if the bodily dimension of the comic takes place in the gap between being and having, between our souls and arseholes, then this hole cannot be plugged or bunged up. We cannot simultaneously be what we have. The critical distance with regard to the world and nature that opens up in the incongruities of humour is testified to in the alienation we experience with regard to our bodies. This is why the experience of the body in pain is so oddly analogous to the pleasures of laughter—which is why it can hurt when you laugh(50).
Firstly I do not know what this means. Not wholly. But I felt here are a few key ideas that I would like to work through and to a degree “flesh out.” Critchley defines humor in terms of a gap between the physical body and the metaphysical self and the returning of those two dimensions to one another. I frame this in my own mind—humor is a reconciliation of the supposed mind/body dichotomy or split. Humor affects not only the body in the form of something physically happening, but we can only make sense of this humor through the logos of the mind, of realizing that whatever funny thing just happened, broke with logic of the mind. And I think maybe this is what Critchley is getting at—that humor is not located solely in the body or in the mind. Humor is located at the intersections of both body and mind.
But there is a place I think that humor works that is maybe not even in the realm of just a simple mind/body split, but that instead humor exists in its next affective nature. Humor exists somewhat in its public nature, in its ability to affect people in public scenarios. Humor wouldn’t necessarily be funny if someone else wasn’t around not to witness it. Thus, humour is both in the mind, in the body and in the affective gaps between, around, and underneath, these temporal and spatial locations.
Incongruency is key here. Humor is all about incongruency and the complexities of non-sense making. The things that are funny are so in part because they are unexpected and do not meet normative expectations. I am reminded of Margaret Cho, an Asian-American bisexual comedian and some of her skits. There is one part in a skit where she takes on the identity of an old “Washer Woman” named Gwen. When you would expect to her to be coming around asking to take in work like laundry, or ironing (as is stereotypical Asian women’swork) she instead pretends to be going around using the line “Hi, my name is Gwen and I’M HERE TO WARSH YER VAGIIIIIIIIINA!!!!!!!!” It’s funny because it is unexpected and really doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. But I laugh because I find it humorous that an Asian woman, supposedly old, a/de sexualized is walking around asking women if she can warsh their vaginas. It does not make sense but we cans see the connection of the mind and body while simultaneously sublimating them. The body is necessary but the mind is also. In the scenario as an audience we are affected by the consequences of stereotyping of Asian women and ways to de normalize those stereotypes.
I don’t have any answers, but I do think that humor is not as simple as we sometimes assume it to be. It is not just that some things are funny and others are not. There are gaps where humor occurs, spaces between bodies and minds. And even then, humor is not simple; it is a complex set of relations, practices, and performances of bodies and the affects of these performances on others. Is there ever an original place of humor, or something’s inherent funny-ness? I don’t think so, which is why I think it is important to think of the humor in terms of the mind, the, body, and affect.
Thursday, September 24, 2009
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Nietzsche Blog
“The Truth is Out There”
“The judgment ‘good’ does not derive from those to whom ‘goodness’ is shown! Rather the ‘good’ themselves—that is, the noble, the powerful, the superior, and the high-minded were the ones who felt themselves and their actions to be good—that is, as of first rank—and posited them as such in contrast to everything low, low-minded, common, and plebian”(12).
In this statement Nietzsche lays out his poststructuralist argument that there are no essential morals or “good” people and “evil” or bad people only interpretations of these terms as constructed by people. There are no essences to these terms or these people instead they are given meaning through historical and cultural connotations—connotations derived from power. In the above quotation it is obvious too that Nietzsche believes that those in power have the ability to construct these meanings in their favor so that they define themselves as “good” or “moral” people because of their positions of power. Nietzsche also asserts on the next page (13) that the power to name those who are “bad” is held by those who have the power to define themselves as “good” and “moral” people.
Nietzsche uses a genealogical method in order to trace how the connotations of “good” and “bad,” “moral,” and evil have changed depending on cultural and political circumstances. In doing this Nietzsche details the fact that there is no inherent truth in the meaning of “good” and “bad” but that the truth is constructed depending on the circumstance. Prior to reading this I had only skimmed over a bit of Nietzschean philosophy never understanding its purpose. Now I see how Nietzsche is a pivotal text for French post-structuralism. Post-structuralism’s basis lies at the idea that there is no inherent truth or essences within human beings, but that we are instead products of both discourse and bodily positionality (as I think Nietzsche alludes to in the idea of “slave mentality.) Bodies are positioned within discourse and language and the ways in which these bodies are constructed determines whether they are imbued with power or are marginalized and lack power. But there is no truth of these bodies; instead they are constructed as true, as good, or as evil and bad.
This may be a trite example because it does not necessarily deal with marginalization of bodily positionalities--but instead marginalization of ideas—and the ways in which truth becomes constructed as Truth or allows for a multiplicity of truths. This example looks at how true is/are Truth/truths. The television show the X-Files is a prime example of how truth is constructed and posits that there may be many versions of truths to be uncovered. The show focuses on the characters of Fox Mulder and Dana Scully as two FBI agents faced with a list of unsolved cases known as the X-Files-the secret files, or the files nobody else is interested in dealing with. Mulder believes in the possibility of extra-terrestrial life, that new-aged monsters exist, and that some people possess super human powers-things that cannot be explained through any conventional means. He is obsessed with uncovering the Truth of these matters, in fact a poster in his office reads, “I Want To Believe,” with a flying saucer in the background. Mulder wants to believe that there is something out there to believe in other than what he or anyone else has been told. Scully is assigned to be Mulder’s partner because she is a medical doctor and she is supposed to disprove all of Mulder’s findings through positivist medical science. Scully believes that science can prove the Truth in any situation that there are always, Always, ALWAYS scientific reasons for the things they encounter. Until she begins to experience some inexplicable phenomena of her own, experiences, which cannot be explained through positivistic science.
Along with Nietzsche, Mulder believes that the people in power, mainly in the government, have possessed the power to construct the truth, the reality that we believe in everyday. He believes that the government is in secret possession of proof of alien life forms and other conspiracies that have harmed the American people. In this sense those in power try to retain an image of “goodness” or “morality” while making Mulder look like a fraud or someone who is bad or at least doing “bad” and unnecessary work. While Mulder does not believe in the precise method of truth that science can uncover he does believe that there is a Truth lying in the Department of Defense, Roswell, the sky. Somewhere there is Truth among the lies. There is Good or Light among the Evil or the Darkness. To Nietzsche there is no Truth, only interpretations of experiences and bodies through discourse and language. There is no Truth lying in a building (the Pentagon) or even in someone’s head (Cigarette Smoking Man) because those truths can only be understood through our interpretations of them.
I too agree with Nietzsche that there is not one Truth but many variations of truths, that truth is influenced by society, culture, and politics, and history. There is no one Truth to search for and uncover but many truths, many experiences, many interpretations that are valid and important to know about. Morality, goodness and evil like truth also have various interpretations depending on who is in the power to construct these terms. If we associate morality with Truth than we assume that only those experiences deemed “good” or “moral” are True-leaving out a variety of other experiences. For communication researchers it is important to recognize that Truth may not exist, that we may never “get to the bottom” of something completely-especially not with numbers or science. Instead we have to listen to the diverse and varied stories of experiences, whether they are of UFOs or marginalized subject positions in order to uncover truths-truths that are subjective yet potentially shared among groups of people sharing similar experiences.
I include this clip just to give a sort of synopsis of the show. There is also a very interesting quote in the middle where a sort of philosopher-scientist says, “Truth is as subjective as reality,” and I feel that this really helps to sum up at least a bit of what Nietzsche’s poststructuralist argument is.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Class Blog #5
I believe Agamben offers us a useful tool for thinking about new and different ways of creating social movements. As Agamben writes, “Whatever singularities cannot form a societas because they do not possess any identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which to seek recognition. In final instance the State can recognize any claim for identity—even that of a State identity within the State…What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a community without affirming an identity that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging”(85).
Agamben is challenging us to defy the State’s way of making people intelligible through identities. Agamben suggests to us that the State can only understand humans through their classifications so the only way to create social change is to disrupt the categorizations, the fixidity of identity categories. This is much in line with radical queer politics, which attempt to organize not under essentialized identity categories (woman, gay, black etc…) but instead organize around political issues like health care and poverty. Unfortunately radical queer politics while preaching a non-identity based politics has unfortunately created a non-identity “identity” based politics, which continues to locate sexuality as a primary focus. Queer politics as it was originally conceived tended to put queer at the forefront foregoing differences within its population. I think Agamben offers us a solution to this problem through the concepts of singularity within community.
Agamben discusses singularity as “neither universal nor an individual included in a series but rather ‘singularity insofar as it is whatever singularity.’ In this conception, such-and-such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class”(1). In this sense singularity is something that is a part of a larger group while still maintaining a sense of individuality. This holds true for the possibilities of organizing social movements where groups made up of somewhat unique individuals gather together for political issues despite their identifications. For example having people who do not identify as necessarily feminist or women organize for reproductive rights, despite the fact they may not possess the ability or desire to reproduce at all. These groups also do not have to go about organizing in traditional means either but may instead use non-traditional methods of resistance-those methods not recognized by the State not organized protests where there are barriers and police officers lining the march/rally route. Instead it may be more beneficial to hold group dinners at someone’s house raising consciousness for reproductive rights for all people (those of color, women and men dealing with forced sterilization, comprehensive sexual education complete with access to information on birth control, informed decisions, as well as information on those questioning their normative sexuality.) Then maybe through a deliberative process the group could come to some decisions and then bring the issues to the State-all people individuals yet in a group come together to support the differences within their group all while advocating an issue.
I am open to this idea-I do think we need to be careful of identity based politics as Butler argues. They lead to the potential alienation and exclusion of people not identified with that group. As Ricki Wilchins a gender and queer theorist notes "Movements and organizations become stronger when they welcome people as members instead of allies." In this sense a movement becomes composed of people focusing on an issue together as opposed to a group which needs allies because the group is comprised of common identity excluding those who vary from it.
However, I think it is naïve to think that people will not feel some sort of bond with those people who seem to have a similar experiences and positionalities. Sometimes it is only in the groups we feel identified with that we feel "at home." Maybe this is a social and cultural construction but for people who face oppression because of their marked and marginalized bodies it doesn't seem to matter because these constructed identities connect them. Maybe it is a connection of oppression as opposed to identity and I feel this is reasonable
I think we need a balance of both kinds of activism noting the need for spaces for groups of similar conceptions of their identities yet also be open to a non-identity based politics where we come together over issues and not identities. There is space for both of these types of organizing each with a different political agenda in mind.
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Class Blog #5
Butler
--
Troubling Gender
I deal with sex, gender, and desire everyday, every hour, every minute. I have to assume that they matter because they matter to me. But do gender, sex, and desire really matter? Does identity matter? How can we understand desire without understanding sex and/or gender? Do my identities located at the intersections as a white, middle class, femme, lesbian, woman and the other multiplicity of categories and identifications matter? Does my body matter?
I begin with something near and dear to my heart-“drag, cross-dressing, and the sexual stylization of butch and femme identities”(187) or what Butler terms subversive bodily acts. While I want to go into this subversive performance by offering a selection of a narrative piece I am working on-I want to contextualize the subversion of these bodily performance through Judith Butler’s work on sex/gender/desire.
Butler aims to denaturalize the connection we associate with sex/gender/and desire saying that they produce one another that they are rooted in a place of discourse, culture, social construction, and history. We often understand or are told that sex is biological, determined by one’s genitalia and their chromosomes. It is “only natural” to classify a person as male or a female-to make people intelligible. A common assumption is that this essentialized understanding of sex leads to the cultural inscriptions of masculine or feminine practices upon a sexed body. Then based on the notions of male/female, masculine/feminine we can decipher normative sexuality. The dichotomous bodies “belong” together-they “complete” each other. Anything other than that is considered deviant, abnormal, or at the very least non-normative. This is what Butler considers the “heterosexual matrix,” or the “respective internal coherence of sex, gender, and desire”(31).
If we eradicate the naturalization and the stability of the categories of sex and gender then how can we understand desire? We attempt to categorize sexual practice based on whether or not they are engaged in by “same” or “different” sexed people. But what if our attempts to gender and sex people are a matter of making them fit into a pattern of heteronormativity? Then the politics of the body of sex/gender/and desire cannot be said to create one another but are instead produced through one another.
But these categories of sex/gender/desire have to be important-they have to matter because bodies live them everyday. All bodies to some degree, but especially those bodies, which make a point of defying the heterosexual matrix, are implicated in structures of power, which, condemn them and attempt to re-discipline their bodies back into normative conceptions of gender/sex/and desire. But what about those people who choose not to conform despite the pressures? Are their subversions actually subversive- are they resistant? Again I have to believe they are because I experience the effects of people’s non-conformity everyday both positive and negative.
I am going to offer a short passage from a paper I will be presenting at NCA on a narrative performance panel. My paper is something like “Femme Drag: Subversive Performances of Female Same-Sex Desire.”
*****
I wake up in the morning and I put on my gender and sexuality identity. Everything I do in the morning while habitual is done with intent.[1] The eyeliner I put on my top lid, lining it with careful precision, the grey ankle boots I place on my feet-they are intentional choices. How am I going to put on my white, femme, lesbian, self today? You see I need my eyeliner and boots in this crazy world we live in because for a femme lesbian they are both my resistance and my protection. They are my subversion, my empowerment, and my survival. You see they are my resistance-something that makes me feel my queer-ness, something that while everyday and mundane, set me apart from all of those people who “subconsciously” perform femininity and masculinity according to the way society has told them to. But they are also my armor against being called a dyke and queer (and not in that good way.)
And isn’t that just a little bit radical? Maybe I am laughing at my own joke here but isn’t it a little bit queer to perform femininity and do it for the purpose— no not the purpose— the desire of other women-preferably those already lesbian (but that’s always negotiable.) And what about performing it for women who don’t look like women at all? I like my girls to look like boys. I say eff the patriarchy—the system that tells me my eyeliner and my boots can’t be my resistance— that these things normalize instead of queer me.
Because my queerness…I want it to stand on it’s own.
My femme drag performance should be— no it is enough to cast me in the role of lesbian, of queer, of gender norm defying queer lesbian.
*****
So I include this here to sort of take Butler up on her notions of subversive bodily performances, but also to problematize her the notion that these resistive practices are taken up solely by those defying the “heterosexual matrix.”
Butler writes, “If the anatomy of the performer is already distinct from the gender of the performance, then the performance suggests a dissonance not only between sex and performance, but sex and gender, and gender and performance. As much as drag creates a unified picture of a ‘woman’…it also reveals the distinctness of those aspects of gendered experience which falsely naturalized as a unity through regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence”(187).
I am indebted to these performances of a gender that doe not cohere with its sex -I am in a relationship based off of butch/femme performance. I am indebted to the way these performances stand out and actually mark my own body as a lesbian or a queer. These are the performances which, on a daily basis are marked as “different” performances, performances that categorize people as others. These are the bodies that walk around constantly scrutinized and marginalized. They are the gender-queer bodies the ones usually seen as fragmented, unfixed, “fluid.” These are not the bodies in “happy limbo of non-identity” (Butler 143) as assumed by Foucault; they are the bodies on trial. But I want to suggest that the performances need not be solely based on those who do not conform their gender to their sex but those who make choices to either conform or not in the little everyday practices. I believe femme drag is a subversive performance because it also defies the heterosexual matrix, through the everyday practice of putting on eyeliner and strapping on boots. The femme in drag is not a unified subject but a subject full of inconsistency, fragmentation, and multiplicity. While maybe the gender and sex are coherent in the femme lesbian performance, the connection to desire is anything but. And if we believe that sex/gender/desire operate under some naturalized connection instead of as an entangled process of production and performance than a woman performing femininity but desiring women blows that connection apart. It proves Butler's theory correct there is no cohesive subject, no subject that just because she is female who performs femininity-and should for all intensive purposes be heterosexual-is not. There is no sex and gender which is beyond desire, nor desire beyond sex and gender, however, there are ways to resist the normative ideas of all three. Femme drag is one way I see this subversive performance occurring through fragmenting the performance of femininity with same-sex female desire-same-sex butch desire. While the femme in drag is fraught with constraints of identity categories, categories that inform her ability to perform her femininity, racial and class constraints, identities that do "indeed" matter, this performance is subversive because it is never fixed as one thing. Always changing, sometimes in corsets, sometimes times in business suits, and other times simply a form of becoming, of consciousness, of desiring. Of changing desires, of changing identities, all while maintaining the consciousness the constraint of femininity. It is complicated, it is complex, it is performance, it is conscious choice, it is limited choice, it is an existence unlike any other.
All bodies to some degree are on trial. All of our bodies are implicated in a system, which is quite rigid in its categorization.
But we have ways to create subversive bodily performances, while limited to exist within the discourse as nothing can intelligible can exist in this abject space, we have ways to resist. These performances may involve only a certain level of heightened consciousness, others, are put into practice. These little moments of resistance, of defying a gender norm (not shaving legs or allowing oneself to cry), of practicing same-sex desire while being identified as a femme, these practices do carry weight. While they may not be the large social movements of our time, they are the mini revolutions within the everyday. And they matter, because I can work with preschoolers as a femme lesbian and be a good teacher, a role-model, and a leader, not a pedophile or molester as some would claim. I see my girlfriend-a butch- in a Speedo swimsuit with a mohawk teaching swimming lessons at the pool where she works, simply giving children and adults the insight into non-normative gender performances-ones they may not see anywhere else during their day. Raising new consciousness, changing people on a micro-level, forcing them to deal with the queers, the people they may reject. I see these performances as subversive, see them working in covert ways, creating resistance and promoting social change and awareness simply to other non-normative ways of being.
These things have to matter.
Identities have to matter
Queering Identity has to matter
Theorizing desire has to matter
I have to believe it matters.
Class Blog #4
Writing the Body Into Being
“There is no law that is not inscribed on bodies. Every law has a hold on the body. Through all sorts of initiations…it transforms them into tables of the law, into living tableaux of rules and customs, into actors in the drama organized by social order…It makes its book out of them. These writings carry out two complementary operations: through them, living beings are ‘packed into a text’…and on the other, the reason…of a society ‘becomes flesh’(140).
I quote de Certeau at length here because I feel that this passage illustrates a way to reconcile text and the body-of bringing the body into being-of writing the body into being (Conquergood, Madison, Pollock et al). In this passage de Certeau lays out the problematics of simply writing the body as though the body were simply a text. When we think of the body solely as a text to be analyzed we forget its human-ness and the politics associated with its everyday experience. In textual analysis we tend to examine the body as something to read to interpret, while forgetting that it is a living being, constantly in motion, constantly fluxuating its position.
Performance theory is one way to reconcile the textualism that the academy privileges while also writing about the body as living, breathing, moving being. De Certeau has been taken up (in fact the aforementioned passage specifically) in performance studies as a way to account for texts but also for performances—both staged and as everyday practice. As Dwight Conquergood notes, “The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined. Transcription is not a transparent or politically innocent for conceptualizing or engaging the world”(147). The body is more than a text, it is a product of historical, political, social, economic, and cultural circumstances.
De Certeau is a good jumping point for thinking about the politics or “the laws” that become inscribed on bodies. We embody the practices of the law, “Sit-down, be quiet, pay attention!” These are not laws, which are written by lawmakers and voted on by those in charge, but are instead hegemonic practices ordering people to conform. In this same respect institutions also attempt to conform to hegemonic white, male, heterosexual, middle-class ways of being—ways that ignore other potentialities of being. However texts in their more traditional form do inscribe laws onto bodies, when sodomy laws were in place restricting the practice of same-sex desire, creating a barrier of access to reproductive rights by creating parental consent laws, and as Conquer good notes, the bureaucratic paperwork presented to immigrants (also discussed by Richard in class). These laws, which are written, try to control and restrain bodies, especially the bodies of whom we conceive of as oppressed.
Foucault expresses the concept of “subjugated knowledges” or the ‘knowledges at the bottom of the hierarchy.”(Conquergood, 147) as the ways that those marginalized people’s experiences and voices are often invalidated. Often times it is these knowledges that are resistive to dominant discourses and dominant performances of power. These “subjugated knowledges make the body central to resistance. This is what Gloria Anzaldua and Cherrie Moraga describe as, “theories of the flesh” or theories of the body as key and central to writing about human subjects—especially in regards to the modes of power created by the racializing, classing, queering, and gendering, of bodies. In this way we can never separate the body from the politics, which, govern it, but we do have agency and the power to resist. When a person at the bottom of the hierarchy chooses to not sit when told, or protest against a war incited for pitiful fallacies and is physically arrested, those other ways of knowing and being gain some power. They break the inscription of law on the body.
I think de Certeau would agree with Conquergood—who has also influenced my understanding--that we should not rid the world of texts, but that we must think also of the bodies and performances alongside them. We must look at and critique textuality as the assumed norm for scholarship, which, often simply looks at the body as text, as a book (even when used metaphorically) and think of and depict the ways that bodies in their humanity, in their very existence can never be truly captured and represented in a text. Through the intervention of performance however, and the re-centering of the body, we may be able to do a better job describing the practices of everyday lives of ordinary people where their knowledges become pertinent to furthering new knowledges. In this process marginalized people not only are able to tell their experiences but in the telling and accepting may be able to heal.
Class Blog #3
offer very obscure examples, which our colleague Brian assures me is the point. He told me that
if I think that Deleuze and Guattari are trying to create a concrete way of being or even
understanding then it will never make sense because they are actually talking about a process of
“doing.” I think this gets at the concept of “Being” versus “becoming.” If we are something (are
as a conjugate of the word to be) then that is all that we are, if we are in process of becoming
something then we have the potential to change who and what it is we are based on what we are
doing. Confusingdefinitely, but in this abstract way sort of makes sense. If Nomadology and
the War Machine are constantly in flux then we escape the ideas that we are in fact something,
that we have essences. Instead we are always a process of movement, I don’t really like the
word fluid, but maybe as Christina said, it is an idea of water, ocean, of liquid. Maybe we ebb
and flow back and forth sometimes between the War Machine and resistance and the State. In
contrast to Nomadology is the idea of the State, which tries to discipline people and bodies into
certain accepted norms. In the State bodies are policed in ways that they are forced into
understandings of “Being,” making it easier for the State to deal with a discipline.
While Deleuze and Guattari would probably not approve of the next part of my blog for me it is
relevant. I am going to offer a contemporary albeit imperfect example of the ways that
Nomadology and the State work together. This was inspired while driving home on Monday
and feeling emotionally exhausted and having NO clue what I was going to write about.
Luckily my IPod was on shuffle and this song came on
and finally some of this theory of Nomadology made some sense to me. A caveat as I stated
before is that this is not a perfect example, but for me helped me to grapple with the text and
make it applicable to me.I heard the song “Every State Line” by Ani DiFranco. I am going to
post the lyrics and a clip from the song and then talk about how I see it making sense and how I
see it as flawed also.
Every State Line: Ani DiFranco
I got pulled over in west Texas
so they could look inside my car
he said are you an american citizen
I said yes sir so far
they made sure I wasn't smuggling
someone in from Mexico
someone willing to settle for america
cause there's nowhere else to go
(chorus)
and every state line
there's a new set of laws
and every police man
comes equipped with extended claws
there's a thousand shades of white
and a thousand shades of black
but the same rule always applies
smile pretty, and watch your back
I broke down in Louisiana
and I had to thumb a ride
got in the first car that pulled over
you can't be picky in the middle of the night
he said
baby, do you like to fool around
baby, do you like to be touched
I said
maybe some other time
fuck you very much
(chorus)
I'm in the middle of alabama
they stare at me where ever I go
I don't think they like my haircut
I don't think they like my clothes
I can't wait to get back to New York City
where at least when I walk down the street
nobody ever hesitates
to tell me exactly what they think of me
(chorus)
a little town in pennsylvania
there was snow on the ground
a parked in an empty lot
where there was no one else around
but I guess I was taking up too much space
as I was trying to get some sleep
'cause an officer came by anyway
and told me I had to leave
(chorus)
--
--I see this song as a way that someone may negotiate the constraints of the War Machine, and the
State. In this song DiFranco is a trope for “nomad” she is constantly moving from place to place
and in every new state that she enters (as in United state of America) she is faced with different
mechanisms of policing by the State. Deleuze and Guattari use the examples of chess and Go to
explain the ways that the State and the War Machine operate (3-
4).
As in the game of Chess there are only certain moves that certain pieces can make, DiFranco is
not free to be in “perpetual movement”(4) as is characteristic of the game Go. Every time
DiFranco gets “going” in her nonnormative directions she is stopped by the State or the police
and the rules set in place for that specific state do not allow or her freedom of movement. As
Deleuze and Guattari articulate the state is “quite perfect, quite complete”(14). There are only
certain ways to move in these states or the State, not with immigrants, not hitchhiking, not
appearing different. In these State apparatuses there is already a completed structure in place to
discipline behavior. She is not supposed to park in an empty lot, not supposed to speed, she
doesn’t fit in with her haircut and clothes-
the parts of her that may be more in line with the war machine. However, as they also clarify
Nomadology is not solely defined by movement but the ability to hold ground, is territorial over
their space. In some instances I think she does this quite well, as in her response to the man who
wants to pick her up from hitchhiking.
Deleuze and Guattari also use the metaphor of the root and the rhizome, which, I think Richard
articulated very well in class: that the root is something that is grounded in one place. Rhizomes
on the other hand, are plants that have shoots sprouting from them in different directions. The
State is something —
something that only allows for movement in one a specific direction. For DiFranco the State are
the states that she enters and is prevented from engaging her nonnormative somewhat nomadic
behaviors. New York City on the other hand is the rhizome a place that may have some sort of
permanence but also has random shoots where she feels a sense of the ability to move (walk
down the street). Her nomadic performance can permeate the State through the rhizome . She
may have roots in a State or the State, but a rhizome like a potato is able to spread in all different
directions and not into one specific location. Thus DiFranco is able to be different in a place,
which, may still be a State in the sense of maintaining a norm and where she maintains roots but
where she feels she is more accepted and able to move about somewhat freely. Although in
New York City she may still be disciplined, it is a different sort of discipline not hegemonic
implied norms, but norms spoken allowed, named and thus, able to be grappled with.
And this is not a perfect example because as Deleuze and Guattari suggest nomads do indeed
occupy space outside of the State, although I think that the State and War Machine constantly
influence one another. They suggest that nomads occupy smooth spaces and change the spaces
that they occupy but that “smooth space is controlled by these two flanks [the forest and
agriculture] thus, showing the constraints of nomadic smooth space. So the song isn’t perfect
but I think it can be useful.
So what—
you may be asking me? What does it mean to understand this theory in terms of the song or on
its own?In terms of the song I think it is an interesting example of how to conceptualize the
somewhat nomadic identity of a person negotiating the State. And I think it is important because
in this sense it refers to identities and how States attempt to discipline identities into certain
norms and patterns of behavior. The War Machine (while constrained) offers a way to be
resistive to the State regime. While we may not have infinite possibilities for resistance the War
Machine allows us some ability to find liminal spaces outside the State, where resistive
identifications or “disidentifications” may be performed. The War Machine limits DiFranco,
she does not have total freedom, because even in the game Go there is a purpose whether it is
strategy or not. So this theory may not give us a prescriptive way to be and act but offers a
process of negotiation or strategy to deal with the constraints of the State and constraints of theWar Machine so that we may ebb and flow between them in a way that allows us to be engaged in a constant process of doing of becoming
Sunday, April 19, 2009
Class Blog #2
Although my translation is different, I found that DeBord identifies the spectacle in thesis 10, as, “Affirmation of appearance and affirmation of all human life, namely social life, as mere appearance.” If the spectacle is appearance, is image, is representation and the affirmation of these images, we can see this being performed so plainly in so many places. In the context of celebrity, we can see how images are affirmed, especially through their repetitive use and for the desire of others in the spectacle to mimic celebrities. As a professor at my undergraduate institution once said, “Celebrities are celebrities because they are celebrities, they are famous for fame’s sake.” Celebrities are not only a part of the spectacle, they are spectacle themselves—performing a spectacular image of what it means to be a celebrity whether it be the multiple attempts in rehab, excessive spending, or adopting children from foreign nations. As DeBord notes in thesis 60, “The celebrity, the spectacular representation of a living being, embodies this banality by embodying the image of a possible role…Celebrities exist to act out various styles of living and viewing society —unfettered, free to express themselves globally (emphasis original). What I notice from this is exactly what my professor noted, celebrities are not celebrities because of their acting, singing, or dancing ability but because they give us, the little people, models of the ways we should desire to live.
As a society we are presented with a character like Paris Hilton, who has no direct connection to being a celebrity, no specific talent (although some will argue that modeling was her talent and that she was a celebrity for that,) yet becomes famous for her spectacular lifestyle — mainly the fact that she is an heiress to a fortune. The recognition of Paris as a celebrity makes it possible for her to later launch an acting and singing career and even more ironically her “reality” show, The Simple Life. In this “reality” show, Paris and one of her friends are transplanted into different situations far removed from their Hollywood lifestyle, usually into small towns with common people, and everyone voyeuristically watches to see if she will in fact stick her hand into the cow’s rectum on the dairy farm while wearing her Prada dress. The fact that the show is even called The Simple Life alludes to the fact that these girls are actually the opposite of simple, but high maintenance, big spenders, causing a scene with the town’s local boys no matter where they are. The connection between the spectacle, celebrity, and capitalism becomes quite clear that they are all in fact contingent upon one another for success of propagating “the spectacle.” But it is also important to return to the question of our participation in the spectacle and whether or not we are conscious in our participation. I provide a clip of Ellen, in which, she becomes Paris Hilton's new BFF (also based off of a reality television show) and in turn partly because she is a comedian, but also because she is at least somewhat of a social critic, makes fun of the Paris Hilton enterprise.
--
--
While Ellen may be poking fun at Paris Hilton's spectacle celebrity lifestyle, commenting on all of her pictures, driving her around in the Smart Car, and dancing in "the club" on the stripper pole, in a sense Ellen simply creates a different celebrity lifestyle of which to potentially mimic. We also begin to see the ways that Paris's lifestyle is taken up in shows like MTV’s Made, Cribs, Sweet 16 and others, which, generally turn ordinary people into celebrities by giving them a make-over, buying them a new car, or showing them living in an extravagant house. While we may think that a Smart Car may be resistive to the spectacle as opposed to driving a "pimped out" SUV it actually creates a new spectacle based on a different celebrity with a different lifestyle. In turn as we discussed in class I do not think DeBord would be more fond of Ellen's commentary on Paris's life since she makes money from her show and resisting the spectacle can not necessarily be done in terms of using capitalistic means, but I did feel that it could illustrate nicely two different examples of celebrity spectacles, different, yet the same. However, I wonder as we also talked about in class is it possible to as Audre Lorde writes, "Dismantle the master's house with the master's tools?" Is it possible to use the spectacle, as a mediated form of communication as a "celebrity" in order to change the existing spectacle?
I do not think that there are many examples of this out there but one that immediately came to mind from reading José Esteban Muñoz’s Disidentifications, was Pedro Zamora, a man/character on MTV’s the Real World: San Francisco. A gay Latino man living with HIV/AIDS, Muñoz claims that Zamora used the medium of the Real World and television to enrich the world with gay Latino visibility as well as AIDS activism. Through his work as a “televisual activist”(143), Zamora was able to use the spectacle of reality television to engage social justice work and reach a large group of people as evidenced through the thousands of letters a week that he received. Zamora was very conscious of his participation in the spectacle from the time he submitted his audition tape but knew that in order to reach a large range of people he would have to use the spectacle to sort of set his own agenda. He accomplished this, by becoming a focal point of the show giving a human face to homosexuals of color living with AIDS. He died soon after the show finished taping and thus, never experienced he kind of celebrity that “reality” television stars are often afforded now. And although there are historical, political, social, racial, gendered, sexualized differences between Hilton and Zamora, we can see how the spectacle may be used for purposes of social justice and not solely spectacle or celebrity.
--
--
Not to conclude too sharply but I do believe we are all caught up in the spectacle at different levels, with different amounts of consciousness. There are certain parts of the spectacle (certain celebrities) we identify with and others we resist. Our choices are limited but the spectacle is not all bad as Gladys pointed out in class Monday night. The spectacle does allow us the medium to transmit messages and access information otherwise denied to us. I leave with another clip of Zamora, maybe a certain type of spectacle or celebrity himself, but one who was conscious enough to know how to use the spectacle to engage the work of resistance and social justice.